Under section 29 of the Corporation Code, the board of directors, if there remains a quorum, can fill up a vacancy in the board of directors, except when: (1) the vacancy was caused by the removal of a director by the stockholders; or (2) the vacancy was caused by the expiration of the term of the director.
If the vacancy was caused by the resignation of a director who was occupying the position in a hold-over capacity, can the remaining directors fill up the vacancy or would that power vest with the stockholders?
In Valle Verde Country Club, Inc., et al. vs. Victor Africa, G.R. No. 151969, September 4, 2009, the stockholders of Valle Verde Country Club (VVCC) elected the following as members of the board during its 1996 annual stockholders’ meeting: Ernesto Villaluna, Jaime C. Dinglasan (Dinglasan), Eduardo Makalintal (Makalintal), Francisco Ortigas III, Victor Salta, Amado M. Santiago, Jr., Fortunato Dee, Augusto Sunico, and Ray Gamboa.
Because of lack of quorum, no stockholders’ meetings were held in the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. Thus, the directors continued to serve in the VVCC Board in a hold-over capacity.
Dinglasan resigned from his position as member of the VVCC Board on September 1998. The following month, the remaining directors elected Eric Roxas (Roxas) to fill in the vacancy created by the resignation of Dinglasan. Subsequently, Makalintal also resigned as member of the VVCC Board. The remaining members of the VVCC board elected Jose Ramirez (Ramirez) to replace Makalintal on March 6, 2001.
Victor Africa (Africa), a member of VVCC, questioned the election of Roxas and Ramirez as members of the VVCC Board with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC), respectively. In his nullification complaint before the RTC, Africa alleged that the election of Roxas was contrary to Section 29, in relation to Section 23, of the Corporation Code. According to Africa, the resulting vacancies should have been filled by the stockholders in a regular or special meeting called for that purpose, and not by the remaining members of the VVCC Board, as was done in this case. The SEC and the RTC agreed with Africa.
The Supreme Court also ruled that the authority to fill in the vacancy caused by the resignation of a holdover director lies with VVCC’s stockholders, not the remaining members of its board of directors. According to the Supreme Court:
We are not persuaded by VVCC’s arguments and, thus, find its petition unmeritorious.
To repeat, the issue for the Court to resolve is whether the remaining directors of a corporation’s Board, still constituting a quorum, can elect another director to fill in a vacancy caused by the resignation of a hold-over director. The resolution of this legal issue is significantly hinged on the determination of what constitutes a director’s term of office. . .
The word “term” has acquired a definite meaning in jurisprudence. In several cases, we have defined “term” as the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The term of office is not affected by the holdover. The term is fixed by statute and it does not change simply because the office may have become vacant, nor because the incumbent holds over in office beyond the end of the term due to the fact that a successor has not been elected and has failed to qualify.
Term is distinguished from tenure in that an officer’s “tenure” represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter (or, in case of holdover, longer) than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.
Based on the above discussion, when Section 23 of the Corporation Code declares that “the board of directors…shall hold office for one (1) year until their successors are elected and qualified,” we construe the provision to mean that the term of the members of the board of directors shall be only for one year; their term expires one year after election to the office. The holdover period – that time from the lapse of one year from a member’s election to the Board and until his successor’s election and qualification – is not part of the director’s original term of office, nor is it a new term; the holdover period, however, constitutes part of his tenure. Corollary, when an incumbent member of the board of directors continues to serve in a holdover capacity, it implies that the office has a fixed term, which has expired, and the incumbent is holding the succeeding term.
After the lapse of one year from his election as member of the VVCC Board in 1996, Makalintal’s term of office is deemed to have already expired. That he continued to serve in the VVCC Board in a holdover capacity cannot be considered as extending his term. To be precise, Makalintal’s term of office began in 1996 and expired in 1997, but, by virtue of the holdover doctrine in Section 23 of the Corporation Code, he continued to hold office until his resignation on November 10, 1998. This holdover period, however, is not to be considered as part of his term, which, as declared, had already expired.
With the expiration of Makalintal’s term of office, a vacancy resulted which, by the terms of Section 29 of the Corporation Code, must be filled by the stockholders of VVCC in a regular or special meeting called for the purpose. To assume – as VVCC does – that the vacancy is caused by Makalintal’s resignation in 1998, not by the expiration of his term in 1997, is both illogical and unreasonable. His resignation as a holdover director did not change the nature of the vacancy; the vacancy due to the expiration of Makalintal’s term had been created long before his resignation. . .
VVCC’s construction of Section 29 of the Corporation Code on the authority to fill up vacancies in the board of directors, in relation to Section 23 thereof, effectively weakens the stockholders’ power to participate in the corporate governance by electing their representatives to the board of directors. The board of directors is the directing and controlling body of the corporation. It is a creation of the stockholders and derives its power to control and direct the affairs of the corporation from them. The board of directors, in drawing to themselves the powers of the corporation, occupies a position of trusteeship in relation to the stockholders, in the sense that the board should exercise not only care and diligence, but utmost good faith in the management of corporate affairs.
The underlying policy of the Corporation Code is that the business and affairs of a corporation must be governed by a board of directors whose members have stood for election, and who have actually been elected by the stockholders, on an annual basis. Only in that way can the directors’ continued accountability to shareholders, and the legitimacy of their decisions that bind the corporation’s stockholders, be assured. The shareholder vote is critical to the theory that legitimizes the exercise of power by the directors or officers over properties that they do not own.
This theory of delegated power of the board of directors similarly explains why, under Section 29 of the Corporation Code, in cases where the vacancy in the corporation’s board of directors is caused not by the expiration of a member’s term, the successor “so elected to fill in a vacancy shall be elected only for the unexpired term of the his predecessor in office.” The law has authorized the remaining members of the board to fill in a vacancy only in specified instances, so as not to retard or impair the corporation’s operations; yet, in recognition of the stockholders’ right to elect the members of the board, it limited the period during which the successor shall serve only to the “unexpired term of his predecessor in office.”
While the Court in El Hogar approved of the practice of the directors to fill vacancies in the directorate, we point out that this ruling was made before the present Corporation Code was enacted and before its Section 29 limited the instances when the remaining directors can fill in vacancies in the board, i.e., when the remaining directors still constitute a quorum and when the vacancy is caused for reasons other than by removal by the stockholders or by expiration of the term.
It also bears noting that the vacancy referred to in Section 29 contemplates a vacancy occurring within the director’s term of office. When a vacancy is created by the expiration of a term, logically, there is no more unexpired term to speak of. Hence, Section 29 declares that it shall be the corporation’s stockholders who shall possess the authority to fill in a vacancy caused by the expiration of a member’s term.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC, when remaining members of the VVCC Board elected Ramirez to replace Makalintal, there was no more unexpired term to speak of, as Makalintal’s one-year term had already expired. Pursuant to law, the authority to fill in the vacancy caused by Makalintal’s leaving lies with the VVCC’s stockholders, not the remaining members of its board of directors.
LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG 