Here are selected June 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on labor law and procedure:
Appeal; decision of DOLE Secretary. For petitioner’s refusal to comply with his deployment assignment, respondent manning agency filed a complaint against him for breach of contract before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). The POEA penalized petitioner with one year suspension from overseas deployment. The suspension was reduced to six months by the Secretary of Labor. Petitioner appealed the latter’s decision with the Office of the President (OP). The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner’s appeal was erroneous. The proper remedy to question the decisions or orders of the Secretary of Labor is via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Appeals to the OP in labor cases have been eliminated, except those involving national interest over which the President may assume jurisdiction. The present case does not affect national interest. Hence, petitioner’s appeal to the OP did not toll the running of the period and the assailed decision of the Secretary of Labor is deemed to have attained finality. Miguel Dela Pena Barairo vs. Office of the President and MST Marine Services (Phils.) Inc., G.R. No. 189314. June 15, 2011.
Appeal from decisions of labor arbiter; bond requirement for perfection of appeal may be relaxed in meritorious cases. The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the labor arbiter. However, under Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC’s Revised Rules of Procedure, the bond may be reduced albeit only (1) on meritorious grounds and (2) upon posting of a partial bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award. For this purpose, the NLRC is not precluded from conducting a preliminary determination of the employer’s financial capability to post the required bond, without necessarily passing upon the merits. In the present case, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reduce bond peremptorily without considering the evidence presented by petitioner showing that it was under a state of receivership. Such circumstance constitutes meritorious grounds to reduce the bond. Moreover, the petitioner exhibited its good faith by posting a partial cash bond during the reglementary period. University Plans, Inc. vs. Belinda P. Solano, et al., G.R. No. 170416, June 22, 2011
Certiorari; substantial compliance. The three material dates which should be stated in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are the dates when the notice of judgment was received, when a motion for reconsideration was filed and when the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was received. These dates should be reflected in the petition to enable the reviewing court to determine if the petition was filed on time. In the present case, the petition filed with the Court of Appeals failed to state when petitioner received the assailed NLRC Decision and when he filed his partial motion for reconsideration. However, this omission is not at all fatal because these material dates are reflected in petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration attached to the petition. The failure to state these two dates in the petition may be excused if the same are evident from the records of the case. The Court further stated that the more important material date which must be duly alleged in the petition is the date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration. Since petitioner has duly complied with this rule, there was substantial compliance with the requisite formalities. William Endeliseo Barroga vs. Data Center College of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 174158. June 27, 2011
Collective bargaining agreement; duty of parties to maintain status quo pending renegotiation. Article 253 of the Labor Code mandates the parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain its force and effect. Likewise, the law does not distinguish between a CBA duly agreed upon by the parties and an imposed CBA like the one in the present case. Hence, considering that no new CBA had been, in the meantime, agreed upon by respondent GMC and the Union, the provisions of the imposed CBA continues to have full force and effect until a new CBA is entered into by the parties. General Milling Corporation-Independent Labor Union [GMC-ILU] vs. General Milling Corporation/General Milling Corporation vs.General Milling Corporation-Independent Labor Union [GMC-ILU], et al., G.R. Nos. 183122/183889, June 15, 2011.
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