Iniquitous and unconscionable interest rate (again)

In September 2009, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in Ileana Dr. Macalino vs. Bank of the Philippines Islands, G.R. No. 175490, September 17, 2009, and held that the interest rate of 1.5% per month on credit card payments should be reduced to 1% per month.

In Sps. Isagani & Diosdada Castro vs. Angelina de Leon Tan, G.R. No. 168940. November 24, 2009, the Supreme Court again faced the issue of whether the interest rate imposed (this time under a loan agreement) is excessive.  Here, the loan agreement (denominated as Kasulatan ng Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay) provided for an interest rate of 5% per month, compounded monthly.  The principal amount of the loan was PhP30,000.

The borrowers (spouses Tan) failed to pay the loan and the lenders (spouses Castro) instituted an extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The lenders emerged as the only bidder and the redemption period expired without the property being redeemed.

A Complaint for Nullification of Mortgage and Foreclosure and/or Partial Rescission of Documents and Damages was subsequently filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. The complainants alleged, inter alia, that the interest rate imposed on the principal amount of P30,000.00 is unconscionable.

The Regional Trial Court reduced the interest rate to 12% per annum and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

In proceedings before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contend that with the removal by the Bangko Sentral of the ceiling on the rate of interest that may be stipulated in a contract of loan, the lender and the borrower could validly agree on any interest rate on loans. Thus, they argue that the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it declared the stipulated interest in the Kasulatan as null as if there was no express stipulation on the compounded interest.

On the other hand, respondents assert that the appellate court correctly struck down the said stipulated interest for being excessive and contrary to morals, if not against the law. They also point out that a contract has the force of law between the parties, but only when the terms, clauses and conditions thereof are not contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy.

Prescriptive period for annulment of contract

How is the prescriptive period computed for the annulment of a contract entered into because of alleged threats and intimidation committed by cronies of then President Marcos?

Under the Civil Code, the action must be brought within four years from the “time the defect of the consent ceases.”  It provides:

Art. 1391. An action for annulment shall be brought within four years.

This period shall begin: In case of intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect of the consent ceases.

In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.

And when the action refers to contracts entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons, from the time the guardianship ceases.

In Associated Bank vs. Spouses Justiniano S. Montano, Sr. and Ligaya Montano, et al, G.R. No. 166383, October 16, 2009, the previous owners of the property claimed that the sale of property was made after their relatives were intimidated and threatened by Marcos cronies. The sale was done in 1976 and an action for reconveyance was filed in 1989.

Legalese 2009 (Week 46)

Lexicon

licit things – things that may be the object of a sales contract

October 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Civil Law

Here are selected October 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on civil law and related laws:

Civil Code

Contract; binding effect. Article 1311 of the New Civil Code states that, “contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.” In this case, the rights and obligations between petitioner and Alfonso are transmissible. There was no mention of a contractual stipulation or provision of law that makes the rights and obligations under the original sales contract for Lot 3, Block 4, Phase IIintransmissible . Hence, Alfonso can transfer her ownership over the said lot to respondents and petitioner is bound to honor its corresponding obligations to the transferee or new lot owner in its subdivision project.

Having transferred all rights and obligations over Lot 3, Block 4, Phase II to respondents, Alfonso could no longer be considered as an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, Alfonso no longer has an interest on the subject matter or the present controversy, having already sold her rights and interests on Lot 3, Block 4, Phase II to herein respondents.   Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. vs. Spouses Francisco & Emelia Buenaventura, as represented by Ricardo Segismundo, G.R. No. 177113, October 2, 2009.

Contract; compromise agreement. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It contemplates mutual concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expenses of litigation; or when litigation has already begun, to end it because of the uncertainty of the result.

The validity of a compromise agreement is dependent upon its fulfillment of the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law; and its terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Gov. Antonio P. Calingin vs. Civil Service Commission and Grace L. Anayron, G.R. No. 183322, October 30, 2009.

Contract;  contract to sell. The very essence of a contract of sale is the transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised.

In contrast, a contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed,i.e., full payment of the purchase price. A contract to sell may not even be considered as a conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of asuspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur. Delfin Tan vs. Erlinda C. Benolirao, Andrew C. Benolirao, Romano C. Benolirao, Dion C. Benolirao, Sps. Reynaldo Taningco and Norma D. Benolirao, Evelyn T. Monreal and Ann Karina Taningco, G.R. No. 153820, October 16, 2009.

World financial crisis as force majeure

Is the world financial crisis a “force majeure” that would allow Dow Chemical to walk away from a contract or require the extension of maturity of a construction loan guaranteed by Donald Trump?  BusinessWeek reports:

Is the economic crisis akin to an earthquake or an act of war? Under force majeure, a long-standing legal doctrine, companies can argue that natural disasters or other calamities should excuse them from living up to the terms of a deal. Now, a growing number are contending in lawsuits that the economic crisis should similarly let them off the hook.

In a Feb. 3 filing in Delaware Chancery Court, Dow Chemical (DOW) said “a cascading sequence of market failures of historic proportions” justifies its effort to walk away from a July 2008 agreement to acquire Rohm & Haas (ROH). Rohm sued the chemical giant in January to force the $15.4 billion deal to go through, and a trial is scheduled for Mar. 9. Dow Chemical, which lost Kuwaiti funding for the deal in December, says in a statement that “the economic reality of late December and early 2009 is far worse than in July 2008.” A Rohm spokesperson says her company firmly believes that “Dow has the means to finance the deal.”

By most accounts, Dow Chemical faces an uphill fight. Judges rejected nearly every effort to revise or rescind deals after the oil price shocks of the early 1970s and the Asian economic collapse in 1997. Robert E. Scott, an expert in business transactions at Columbia Law School, says courts tend to dismiss economic force majeure cases because they “don’t want to let parties get out of contracts too easily.” And Scott doesn’t think the current downturn will lead to different results.

Still, lawyers say they expect more businesses to cite the meltdown as an excuse to dodge obligations. Luc A. Despins, a bankruptcy attorney at Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker in New York, says he already has seen several companies use that argument in negotiations with creditors.

Business contracts often contain force majeure clauses, which detail events that can allow a company to delay or cancel what it has agreed to do. Events such as fires, floods, riots, strikes, and terrorism are typically specified. A construction loan pact between Donald Trump and Deutsche Bank (DB) also includes the unusually broad phrase “any other event or circumstance not within the reasonable control” of the borrower. Trump is now arguing in a New York State court that the “calamitous economy” falls under that definition and should preclude Deutsche Bank from collecting $40 million on a loan that he personally guaranteed for a hotel and condominium tower in Chicago. “A lot of people are starting to say that we’re in a depression,” says Trump, “but it’s a lot better if you have the language in your contract.” Deutsche Bank declined to comment on the pending lawsuit.

In Megaworld Globus Asia, Inc. vs. Mila S. Tanseco, G.R. No. 181206, October 9, 2009, Megaworld failed to deliver a pre-sold condominium unit on the stipulated delivery date of the unit. In its Answer to the complaint filed by the buyer, Megaworld attributed the delay to the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

Grandparents’ legal obligation to support their grandchildren

Cheryl married Edward Lim sometime 1979 and they have three children. Cheryl, Edward and their children lived at the house of Edward’s parents, Prudencio and Filomena, in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano. Edward was employed with the family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000 and shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

Cheryl caught Edward in “a very compromising situation” with the midwife of Chua Giak. After a violent confrontation with Edward, Cheryl left the Forbes Park residence on October 14, 1990. She subsequently sued, for herself and her children, Edward, Edward’s parents, and Edward’s grandparents for support.

In a judgment rendered on January 31, 1996, the regional trial court ordered Edward and his parents to “jointly” provide P40,000 monthly support to Cheryl and her children, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and Edward’s parents the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability.

Edward’s parents appealed to the Court of Appeals. They argued that while Edward’s income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be “in keeping with the financial capacity of the family” under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).