January 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law

Here are select January 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law:

Civil Procedure

Annulment of Judgment; exception to final judgment rule; lack of due process as additional ground. A petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. “The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an affective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest.”

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona v. Romeo Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue, and Esteban Balangue, Jr.; G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013

Appeal; filing of motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in CA does not toll fifteen-day period to appeal; rule suspended in exceptional cases to serve substantial justice. The assailed CA resolution upheld the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the CA does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal, citing Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson. However, in previous cases we suspended this rule in order to serve substantial justice.

August 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Civil Law

Here are select August 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on civil law:

Civil Code

Common carrier; damages. The operator of a. school bus service is a common carrier in the eyes of the law. He is bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the conduct of his business. He is presumed to be negligent when death occurs to a passenger. His liability may include indemnity for loss of earning capacity even if the deceased passenger may only be an unemployed high school student at the time of the accident. Spouses Teodorico and Nanette Pereña v. Spouses Nicolas and Teresita L. Zarate, et al.; G.R. No. 157917. August 29, 2012.

Contracts; rescission; consequences are restitution and in this case, each party will bear its own damage.  As correctly observed by the RTC, the rescissory action taken by GSIS is pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code. In cases involving rescission under the said provision, mutual restitution is required. The parties should be brought back to their original position prior to the inception of the contract. “Accordingly, when a decree of rescission is handed down, it is the duty of the court to require both parties to surrender that which they have respectively received and to place each other as far as practicable in [their] original situation.” Pursuant to this, Goldloop should return to GSIS the possession and control of the property subject of their agreements while GSIS should reimburse Goldloop whatever amount it had received from the latter by reason of the MOA and the Addendum.

Relevant also is the provision of Article 1192 of the Civil Code which reads: “In case both parties have committed a breach of the obligation, the liability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. If it cannot be determined which of the parties first violated the contract, the same shall be deemed extinguished, and each shall bear his own damages.” (Emphasis suppied.)

March 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Civil Law

Here are selected March 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on civil law:

Civil Code

Conjugal partnership; effects of legal separation; forfeiture of share in profits. Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. Thus it is only the offending spouse’s share in the net profits, and not the share in the property, which is forfeited. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that “[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.” Mario Siochi vs. Alfredo Gozon, et al./Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. Vs. Mario Siochi, et al., G.R. No. 169900/G.R. No. 169977, March 18, 2010

Conjugal partnership; presumption of conjugal nature; need for marital consent. The Civil Code of the Philippines, the law in force at the time of the celebration of the marriage between Martha and Manuel in 1957, provides all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This includes property which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses. The court is not persuaded by Titan’s arguments that the property was Martha’s exclusive property because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his income in 1970, hence he could not have had the financial capacity to contribute to the purchase of the property in 1970; and that Manuel admitted that it was Martha who concluded the original purchase of the property.  In consonance with its ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel was not required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.  Here, we find that Titan failed to overturn the presumption that the property, purchased during the spouses’ marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership. Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent of both spouses.  Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership”.  Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that “(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law”. Titan Construction Corporation Vs. Manuel A. David, Sr. and Martha S. David, G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010.

October 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Civil Law

Here are selected October 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on civil law and related laws:

Civil Code

Contract; binding effect. Article 1311 of the New Civil Code states that, “contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.” In this case, the rights and obligations between petitioner and Alfonso are transmissible. There was no mention of a contractual stipulation or provision of law that makes the rights and obligations under the original sales contract for Lot 3, Block 4, Phase IIintransmissible . Hence, Alfonso can transfer her ownership over the said lot to respondents and petitioner is bound to honor its corresponding obligations to the transferee or new lot owner in its subdivision project.

Having transferred all rights and obligations over Lot 3, Block 4, Phase II to respondents, Alfonso could no longer be considered as an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, Alfonso no longer has an interest on the subject matter or the present controversy, having already sold her rights and interests on Lot 3, Block 4, Phase II to herein respondents.   Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. vs. Spouses Francisco & Emelia Buenaventura, as represented by Ricardo Segismundo, G.R. No. 177113, October 2, 2009.

Contract; compromise agreement. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It contemplates mutual concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expenses of litigation; or when litigation has already begun, to end it because of the uncertainty of the result.

The validity of a compromise agreement is dependent upon its fulfillment of the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law; and its terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Gov. Antonio P. Calingin vs. Civil Service Commission and Grace L. Anayron, G.R. No. 183322, October 30, 2009.

Contract;  contract to sell. The very essence of a contract of sale is the transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised.

In contrast, a contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed,i.e., full payment of the purchase price. A contract to sell may not even be considered as a conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of asuspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur. Delfin Tan vs. Erlinda C. Benolirao, Andrew C. Benolirao, Romano C. Benolirao, Dion C. Benolirao, Sps. Reynaldo Taningco and Norma D. Benolirao, Evelyn T. Monreal and Ann Karina Taningco, G.R. No. 153820, October 16, 2009.

Grandparents’ legal obligation to support their grandchildren

Cheryl married Edward Lim sometime 1979 and they have three children. Cheryl, Edward and their children lived at the house of Edward’s parents, Prudencio and Filomena, in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano. Edward was employed with the family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000 and shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

Cheryl caught Edward in “a very compromising situation” with the midwife of Chua Giak. After a violent confrontation with Edward, Cheryl left the Forbes Park residence on October 14, 1990. She subsequently sued, for herself and her children, Edward, Edward’s parents, and Edward’s grandparents for support.

In a judgment rendered on January 31, 1996, the regional trial court ordered Edward and his parents to “jointly” provide P40,000 monthly support to Cheryl and her children, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and Edward’s parents the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability.

Edward’s parents appealed to the Court of Appeals. They argued that while Edward’s income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be “in keeping with the financial capacity of the family” under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).