October 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Here are selected October 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on political law:

Constitutional Law

Bail.  Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that “All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.”

Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.

The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.  The People of the Philippines vs. Luis Plaza y Bucalon, G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009.

Civil Service Commission; powers. The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, has statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service. Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the powers of the Commission, including the power to issue rules and regulations and to review appointments. Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et al., G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009.

Commission on Audit;  powers. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by P.D. No. 1445, the COA, as one of the three independent constitutional commissions, is specifically vested with the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in trust by the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations. To ensure the effective discharge of its functions, it is vested with ample powers, subject to constitutional limitations, to define the scope of its audit and examination and establish the techniques and methods required therefor, to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

Clearly, the matter of allowing or disallowing a money claim against petitioner is within the primary power of the COA to decide. This no doubt includes money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758. Respondents’ claim against petitioner, although it has already been validated by the trial court’s final decision, likewise belongs to that class of claims; hence, it must first be filed with the COA before execution could proceed. And from the decision therein, the aggrieved party is afforded a remedy by elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari in accordance with Section 1 Rule XI, of the COA Rules of Procedure.  National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs. Mario Abayari, et al., G.R. No. 166508, October 2, 2009.

Legalese 2009 (Week 43)

Lexicon

accretion – in succession, the implied institution of a co-heir, co-devisee, or co-legatee to a portion of the inheritance left vacant by another co-heir, co-devisee, or co-legatee by reason of predecease, incapacity or repudiation (Comments and Cases on Succession, p. 544 [2003]).

September 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law

Here are selected September 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on remedial law:

Action; forcible entry. There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. The plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession and that he was deprived thereof.

In the instant case, respondents’ house was constructed in 1983 and they had prior physical possession until they were deprived thereof by petitioners. To substantiate their claims, respondents submitted the affidavit, dated September 20, 2002, of Carlos C. Menil and Lolito S. Bito, who witnessed the demolition of respondents’ house during the latter’s absence. Mr. Menil and Mr. Bito attested that they saw petitioner Rogelio personally supervising the demolition of respondents’ house, and that he erected a concrete fence enclosing the area where the house formerly stood. Petitioners failed to refute the foregoing allegations except with bare denials.

While petitioners hold title to the subject property where the house was located, the sole issue in forcible entry cases is who had prior possession de facto of the disputed property. In Dy, the Court held that these are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved; that is why it is a special civil action with a special procedure.  Spouses Rogelio F. Lopez and Teotima G. Lopez vs. Samuel R. Espinosa and Angelita S. Espinosa, G.R. No. 184225, September 4, 2009

Action; nature.  Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Undeniably, Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution. Zenaida R. Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, et al.  G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009.

Action; reconveyance. An action for reconveyance or accion reivindicatoria has no effect and can exist at the same time as ejectment cases involving the same property. This is because the only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties involved. Ejectment cases are designed to summarily restore physical possession to one who has been illegally deprived of such possession, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties’ opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. The question of ownership may only be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.   Iglesia Evangelisca Metodista En Las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF), Inc. vs. Nataniel B. Juane/Nataniel B. Juane Vs. Iglesia Evangelisca Metodista En Las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF), Inc, G.R. No. 172447, September 18, 2009.

Remedies for non-payment of loan secured by mortgage and checks

According to the Supreme Court, a creditor has three (3) alternative remedies if the debtor fails (or unjustly refuses) to pay his debt when it falls due and the debt is secured by a mortgage and by a check:

. . . the creditor has three options against the debtor and the exercise of one will bar the exercise of the others. He may pursue either of the three but not all or a combination of them.

First, the creditor may file a collection suit against the debtor. This will open up all the properties of the debtor to attachment and execution, even the mortgaged property itself. Second, the creditor may opt to foreclose on the mortgaged property. In case the debt is not fully satisfied, he may sue the debtor for deficiency judgment (not a collection case for the whole indebtedness), in which case, all the properties of the debtor, other than the mortgaged property, are again opened up for the satisfaction of the deficiency. Lastly, the creditor may opt to sue the debtor for violation of BP 22 if the checks securing the obligation bounce. Circular 57-97 and Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court both provide that the criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, i.e., a collection suit. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.

Given the special circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court did not apply the above rule in Spouses Simon Yap and Milagros Guevarra vs. First e-Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 169889, September 29, 2009. Here, Sammy Yap obtained a loan from PDCP. As security, his parents executed a third party mortgage covering their land and the warehouse standing on it. In addition, Yap delivered six post dated checks to PDCP.

The checks bounced and PDCP filed a complaint for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22). PDCP subsequently filed an application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.

September 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Here are selected September 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on legal and judicial ethics:

Disbarment; prescription. Neither the lapse of time from the occurrence of the cause nor the motivation for the filing of the complaint diminished the Court’s inherent power to discipline a member of the Bar whenever appropriate. First of all, the ordinary statutes of limitation had no application to disbarment or suspension proceedings against members of the Bar. Indeed, such proceedings are sui generis. They are not akin to the trials of actions or suits in which interests and rights are enforced by the plaintiffs against the defendants, but are rather investigations into the conduct of the members of the Bar made by the Supreme Court within the context of its plenary powers expressly granted by the Constitution to regulate the practice of law. The proceedings, which the Court may even motu proprio initiate, have neither plaintiffs nor prosecutors. The public interest is their primary objective, the true question for determination being whether or not the respondent members of the Bar are still fit to be allowed to retain their memberships and to enjoy the privileges appurtenant to such memberships.  Imelda Bides-Ulaso vs. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, A.C. No. 7297, September 29, 2009.

Disbarment;  withdrawal by complainant. The agreement between Bides and Ulaso stipulating the withdrawal of the disbarment case against the respondent did not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue the present administrative proceeding against the respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.  Imelda Bides-Ulaso vs. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, A.C. No. 7297, September 29, 2009.

Legalese 2009 (Week 42)

Lexicon

partnership - a contract where two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. (Civil Code, art. 1767).