November 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law

Here are selected November 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law:

Civil Procedure

Appeal; argument raised for first time on appeal. As a last ditch effort, petitioner asserts that the property is a road right of way; thus, it cannot be subject of a writ of execution.  The argument must be rejected because it was raised for the first time in this petition.  In the trial court and the CA, petitioner’s arguments zeroed in on the alleged conjugal nature of the property.  It is well settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.  To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.  Evangeline D. Imani vs. Metroplitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010.

Appeal; argument raised for first time on appeal. The petitioners now claim that the Motion for Reconsideration, filed by the respondent on May 18, 1993 from the September 18, 1992 Order of the RTC, was filed out of time.  The petitioners make this claim to justify their contention that the subsequent rulings of the RTC, including the June 2, 1993 and October 1, 1993 Orders, are barred by res judicata.

We reject this belated claim as the petitioners raised this only for the first time on appeal, particularly, in their Memorandum.  In fact, the petitioners never raised this issue in the proceedings before the court a quo or in the present petition for review.

As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change the theory on appeal.  Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.  Thus, to permit the petitioners in this case to change their theory on appeal would thus be unfair to the respondent and offend the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.  Spouses Ernesto and Vicenta Topacio vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010.

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May 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law

Here are selected May 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law:

Civil Procedure

Appeal; direct appeal to Supreme Court from trial court decision improper.  Records show that on December 13, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision finding that petitioner can execute judgment on the additional attorney’s fees but only up to the extent of P1,000,000.00, not the entire amount of P20,000,000.00 as prayed for in his petition.  Petitioner received a copy of the assailed decision on December 22, 2004.  Petitioner moved for reconsideration on December 29, 2004, but the same was denied in the trial court’s Order dated March 1, 2005.  Petitioner received a copy of the challenged order on March 7, 2005.  On March 17, 2005, instead of appealing the assailed decision and order of the trial court to the Court of Appeals via a notice of appeal under Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari directly with this Court, stating that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law.  This is a procedural misstep.  Although denominated as petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner, in questioning the decision and order of the trial court which were rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, should have taken the appeal to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from notice of the trial court’s March 1, 2005 Order, i.e., within 15 days counted from March 7, 2005 (date of receipt of the appealed order), or until March 22, 2005, by filing a notice of appeal with the trial court which rendered the decision and order appealed from and serving copies thereof upon the adverse party pursuant to Sections 2(a) and 3 of Rule 41.  Clearly, when petitioner sought to assail the decision and order of the trial court, an appeal to the Court of Appeals was the adequate remedy which he should have availed of, instead of filing a petition directly with this Court.  Hicoblo M. Catly (deceased), subtituted by his wife, Lourdes A. Catly vs. William Navarro, et al., G.R. No. 167239, May 5, 2010

Appeal; failure to properly indicate appealing party; ground for dismissal.  With respect to the first case against Marcelina, we resolve to dismiss the appeal of Felisa.  Section 5 of Rule 45 provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply, among others, with the contents of the petition for review on certiorari shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.  Section 4 of the same rule mandates, among others, that the petition should state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner.  In this case, Felisa indicated in the caption as well as in the parties portion of the petition that she is the landowner.  Even in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, Felisa attested that she is the petitioner in the instant case.  However, it appears in the PARAD records that the owners of the subject 14,000-square meter agricultural land are Rosa R. Pajarito (Pajarito), Elvira A. Madolora (Madolora) and Anastacia F. Lagado (Lagado).  Felisa is only the representative of the said landowners with respect to the first case against Marcelina.  Thus, for failure of Felisa to indicate the appealing party with respect to the said case, the appeal must perforce be dismissed.  However, such failure does not affect the appeal on the other three cases as Felisa is the owner/co-owner of the landholdings subject of said three cases.  Felisa Ferrer vs. Domingo Carganillo, et al., G.R. No. 170956, May 12, 2010

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April 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law

Here are selected April 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law:

Civil Procedure

Actions; action for injunction.  As a rule, actions for injunction and damages lie within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691.  An action for injunction is a suit which has for its purpose the enjoinment of the defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from the commission or continuance of a specific act, or his compulsion to continue performance of a particular act.  It has an independent existence, and is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as a part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding.  In an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.  Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Merlino E.  Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No.  160270, April 23, 2010.

Appeal; argument raised for first time on appeal.  Petitioner had, of course, endeavored to establish that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had served him a demand to vacate the subject parcel as early as 31 July 1996.  Correctly brushed aside by the Court of Appeals on the ground, among others, that respondent had no participation in its preparation, we find said demand letter of little or no use to petitioner’s cause in view of its non-presentation before the MeTC.  However, much as it may now be expedient for petitioner to anchor his cause thereon, said demand letter was first introduced in the record only as an attachment to his reply to respondent’s comment to the motion for reconsideration of the 14 July 2005 order issued by the RTC.  The rule is settled, however, that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.  Basic consideration of due process impels this rule.  Hubert Nuñez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010.

Appeal; computation of period where last day is Sunday or legal holiday.  Petitioner’s petition for review (under Rule 42) and motion for reconsideration before the appellate court were filed well within the reglementary period for the filing thereof.  It must be noted that petitioner received her copy of the RTC decision on April 13, 2007. Following the Rules of Court, she had 15 days or until April 28, 2007 to file her petition for review before the CA. Section 1 of Rule 42 provides:

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November 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law

Here are selected November 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on remedial law:

Action;  forum shopping. Petitioners Espiritu, et al. point out that the certificate of non-forum shopping that respondents KPE and Petron attached to the petition they filed with the Court of Appeals was inadequate, having been signed only by Petron, through Atty. Cruz.

But, while procedural requirements such as that of submittal of a certificate of non-forum shopping cannot be totally disregarded, they may be deemed substantially complied with under justifiable circumstances. One of these circumstances is where the petitioners filed a collective action in which they share a common interest in its subject matter or raise a common cause of action. In such a case, the certification by one of the petitioners may be deemed sufficient.

Here, KPE and Petron shared a common cause of action against petitioners Espiritu, et al., namely, the violation of their proprietary rights with respect to the use of Gasul tanks and trademark. Furthermore, Atty. Cruz said in his certification that he was executing it “for and on behalf of the Corporation, and co-petitioner Carmen J. Doloiras.” Thus, the object of the requirement – to ensure that a party takes no recourse to multiple forums – was substantially achieved. Besides, the failure of KPE to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping does not render the petition defective with respect to Petron which signed it through Atty. Cruz. The Court of Appeals, therefore, acted correctly in giving due course to the petition before it.  Manuel C. Espiritu, Jr., et al. vs. Petron Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 170891, November 24, 2009.

Action;  real party in interest. As the successor-in-interest of the late Arsenio E. Concepcion and co-owner of the subject property, respondent Nenita S. Concepcion is entitled to prosecute the ejectment case not only in a representative capacity, but as a real party-in-interest. Article 487 of the Civil Code states, “Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.” Hence, assuming that respondent failed to submit the proper documents showing her capacity to sue in a representative capacity for the estate of her deceased husband, the Court, in the interest of speedy disposition of cases, may deem her capacitated to prosecute the ejectment case as a real party-in-interest being a co-owner of the subject property considering that the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and has also acquired jurisdiction over the parties, including respondent Nenita S. Concepcion.  Angelina S. Soriente, et al. vs. The Estate of the late Arsenio E. Concepcion, etc., G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009.

Appeal; locus standi. Petitioners correctly argue that the Credit Cooperative has no locus standi on appeal, since it failed to file a notice of appeal to the RTC’s September 14, 1999 Decision granting the motion for summary judgment. It was only the Union which appealed the case through a notice of appeal filed by its counsel, Atty. Luciano R. Caraang (Atty. Caraang). There is also no showing that Atty. Caraang represented both the Union and the Credit Cooperative in filing such notice of appeal. In fact, the Credit Cooperative did not deny its failure to file an appeal; however, it argued that it filed with the Court of Appeals an appellant’s brief in compliance with the appellate court’s directive to submit one. Suffice it to state that the Court of Appeals’ directive for the Credit Cooperative to file its brief did not clothe the Credit Cooperative with locus standi on appeal. The purpose of the filing of the brief is merely to present, in coherent and concise form, the points and questions in controversy, and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case, to assist the court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion. The Court of Appeals may have ordered the Credit Cooperative to submit its brief to enable it to properly dispose of the case on appeal. However, in the Credit Cooperative’s brief, not only did it ask for the reversal of the Summary Judgment but also prayed for the return of its garnished funds. This cannot be allowed. It would be grave error to grant the relief prayed for without violating the well-settled rule that a party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.

The rule is clear that no modification of judgment could be granted to a party who did not appeal.   Jose Feliciano Loy, et al. vs. San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEU-PTGWO), et al., G.R. No. 164886, November 24, 2009.

Arbitration;  third parties. We agree with the CA ruling that the BPPA arbitration clause does not apply to the present case since third parties are involved. Any judgment or ruling to be rendered by the panel of arbitrators will be useless if third parties are included in the case, since the arbitral ruling will not bind them; they are not parties to the arbitration agreement. In the present case, DOLE included as parties the spouses Abujos and Oribanex since they are necessary parties, i.e., they were directly involved in the BPPA violation DOLE alleged, and their participation are indispensable for a complete resolution of the dispute. To require the spouses Abujos and Oribanex to submit themselves to arbitration and to abide by whatever judgment or ruling the panel of arbitrators shall make is legally untenable; no law and no agreement made with their participation can compel them to submit to arbitration.  Stanfilco Employees Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. DOLE Philippines, Inc. (Stanfilco Division), Oribanex Services, Inc., Spouses Elly and Myrna Abujos, G.R. No. 154048, November 27, 2009.

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July 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law

Here are selected July 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on remedial law:

Action;  certification of non-forum shopping.  Under Section 3, par. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, (1) that he has not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and no such other action or claim is pending therein; (2) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (3) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

The reason the certification of non-forum shopping is required to be accomplished by the plaintiff or principal party himself is because he has actual knowledge of whether he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies. In case the plaintiff or principal party is a juridical entity, such as petitioner, the certification may be signed by an authorized person who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be established by the documents.

Although petitioner submitted a verification/certification of non-forum shopping, affiant Edgar L. Chavez had no authority to sign the verification/certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition filed in the Court of Appeals. The records disclose that the authority of Chavez was to represent petitioner only before the NLRC. Moreover, the board resolution showing such authority was neither certified nor authenticated by the Corporate Secretary. The Corporate Secretary should have attested to the fact that, indeed, petitioner’s Board of Directors had approved a Resolution on August 11, 2005, authorizing Chavez, to file the petition and to sign the verification/certification of non-forum shopping.  Davao Contractors Development Cooperative (DACODECO), represented by Chairman of the Board Engr. L. Chavez vs. Marilyn A. Pasawa, G.R. No. 172174, July 9, 2009.

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March 2009 Decisions on Remedial Law

Here are selected March 2009 decisions of the Supreme Court on remedial law:

Appeal;  failure to file brief.  In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the authority of the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief is a matter of judicial discretion. Thus, a dismissal based on this ground is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must be observed, bearing in mind the background and web of circumstances surrounding the case.  In the present case, the petitioner blames its former handling lawyer for failing to file the appellant’s brief on time. This lawyer was allegedly transferring to another law office at the time the appellant’s brief was due to be filed. In his excitement to transfer to his new firm, he forgot about the appeal and the scheduled deadline; he likewise forgot his responsibility to endorse the case to another lawyer in the law office.  Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court held the failure to file the appeal brief inexcusable.  Bachrach Corporation vs. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. 159915, March 12, 2009.

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