Here are select March 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on tax law:
National Internal Revenue Code; value-added tax; zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales; unutilized input value-added tax; claims for tax credit or refund; period to file appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals. Section 112 (D) of the National Internal Revenue Code provides the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a 120-day period from submission of complete documents in support of the administrative claim within which to act on claims for refund/applications for issuance of the tax credit certificate. Upon denial of the claim or application, or upon expiration of the 120-day period, the taxpayer only has 30 days within which to appeal said adverse decision or unacted claim before the CTA, otherwise, said judicial claim shall be considered as filed out of time. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Silicon Philippines, Inc. (formerly Intel Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.), G.R. No. 169778, March 12, 2014.
National Internal Revenue Code; value-added tax; unutilized input VAT; claims for tax credit or refund; prescriptive periods. (1) An administrative claim must be filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales were made. (2) The CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the administrative claim within which to decide whether to grant a refund or issue a tax credit certificate. The 120-day period may extend beyond the two-year period from the filing of the administrative claim if the claim is filed in the later part of the two-year period. If the 120-day period expires without any decision from the CIR, then the administrative claim may be considered to be denied by inaction. (3) A judicial claim must be filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) within 30 days from the receipt of the CIR’s decision denying the administrative claim or from the expiration of the 120-day period without any action from the CIR. (4) All taxpayers can rely on Bureau of Internal Revenue Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on December 10, 2003 up to its reversal by the Court in the Aichi case on October 6, 2010, as an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional 120+30 day periods. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Silicon Philippines, Inc. (formerly Intel Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.), G.R. No. 169778, March 12, 2014.
Here are select March 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and procedure:
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Conspiracy; liability of conspirators. Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwin’s liability is not diminished since he and the others with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation. Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one helpless victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead, there is no question that the accused took advantage of their superior strength. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the decision of the lower courts finding accused Erwin guilty of murder. People of the Philippines v. Erwin Tamayo y Bautisa, G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 2014.
Rape; rape victim with a mental disability either deprived of reason or demented. Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered rape, to wit: paragraph 1(b) – when the offended party is deprived of reason; and paragraph 1(d) – when the offended party is demented. Under paragraph 1(d), the term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual’s former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, under paragraph 1(b), the phrase deprived of reason has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Ventura Sr., G.R. No. 205230, March 12, 2014.
Here are select March 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:
Attorney; Disbarment cases; Initiation. Complainants who are members of the Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Jimenez for violating Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence in handling an appeal in a case involving the Association and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.
The Supreme Court held that the complainants have personality to file the disbarment case. In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. Further, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, Atty. Jimenez had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. However, the Supreme Court only suspended Atty. Jimenez from the practice of law for one month. Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. v. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez,A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014.
Here are select March 2104 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on commercial law:
Corporations; piercing the corporate veil. It has long been settled that the law vests a corporation with a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation, by legal fiction and convenience, is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it. Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times impenetrable and cannot be extended to a point beyond its reason and policy. Circumstances might deny a claim for corporate personality, under the “doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.”
Piercing the veil of corporate fiction is an equitable doctrine developed to address situations where the separate corporate personality of a corporation is abused or used for wrongful purposes. Under the doctrine, the corporate existence may be disregarded where the entity is formed or used for non-legitimate purposes, such as to evade a just and due obligation, or to justify a wrong, to shield or perpetrate fraud or to carry out similar or inequitable considerations, other unjustifiable aims or intentions, in which case, the fiction will be disregarded and the individuals composing it and the two corporations will be treated as identical.
In the present case, we see an indubitable link between CBB’s closure and Binswanger’s incorporation. CBB ceased to exist only in name; it re-emerged in the person of Binswanger for an urgent purpose — to avoid payment by CBB of the last two installments of its monetary obligation to Livesey, as well as its other financial liabilities. Freed of CBB’s liabilities, especially that owing to Livesey, Binswanger can continue, as it did continue, CBB’s real estate brokerage business. Eric Godfrey Stanley Livesey v. Binswanger Philippines, Inc. and Keith Elliot, G.R. No. 177493, March 19, 2014.
Here are select March 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on civil law:
Action for quieting of title; trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed property which is admittedly still part of the public domain. Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore correct in dismissing the complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed property which is admittedly still part of the public domain. As held in Dajunos v. Tandayag (G.R. Nos. L-32651-52, 31 August 1971, 40 SCRA 449):
x x x The Tarucs’ action was for “quieting of title” and necessitated determination of the respective rights of the litigants, both claimants to a free patent title, over a piece of property, admittedly public land. The law, administration, disposition and alienation of public lands with the Director of Lands subject, of course, to the control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
In sum, the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 1218 on October 28, 1968 is a patent nullity. The lower court did not have power to determine who (the Firmalos or the Tarucs) were entitled to an award of free patent title over that piece of property that yet belonged to the public domain. Neither did it have power to adjudge the Tarucs as entitled to the “true equitable ownership” thereof, the latter’s effect being the same: the exclusion of the Firmalos in favor of the Tarucs. Heirs of Pacifico Pocido, et al. v. Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua, G.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014.
Action for quieting of title. In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for “an adjudication that a claim of title or interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist.” Heirs of Pacifico Pocido, et al. v. Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua, G.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014.