Here are select August 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on civil law:
Common carrier; damages. The operator of a. school bus service is a common carrier in the eyes of the law. He is bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the conduct of his business. He is presumed to be negligent when death occurs to a passenger. His liability may include indemnity for loss of earning capacity even if the deceased passenger may only be an unemployed high school student at the time of the accident. Spouses Teodorico and Nanette Pereña v. Spouses Nicolas and Teresita L. Zarate, et al.; G.R. No. 157917. August 29, 2012.
Contracts; rescission; consequences are restitution and in this case, each party will bear its own damage. As correctly observed by the RTC, the rescissory action taken by GSIS is pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code. In cases involving rescission under the said provision, mutual restitution is required. The parties should be brought back to their original position prior to the inception of the contract. “Accordingly, when a decree of rescission is handed down, it is the duty of the court to require both parties to surrender that which they have respectively received and to place each other as far as practicable in [their] original situation.” Pursuant to this, Goldloop should return to GSIS the possession and control of the property subject of their agreements while GSIS should reimburse Goldloop whatever amount it had received from the latter by reason of the MOA and the Addendum.
Relevant also is the provision of Article 1192 of the Civil Code which reads: “In case both parties have committed a breach of the obligation, the liability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. If it cannot be determined which of the parties first violated the contract, the same shall be deemed extinguished, and each shall bear his own damages.” (Emphasis suppied.)
Here are selected July 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on civil law:
Agency; doctrine of apparent authority. The doctrine of apparent authority in respect of government contracts, has been restated to mean that the government is NOT bound by unauthorized acts of its agents, even though within the apparent scope of their authority. Under the law on agency, however, “apparent authority” is defined as the power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons arising from the other’s manifestations to such third person such that the liability of the principal for the acts and contracts of his agent extends to those which are within the apparent scope of the authority conferred on him, although no actual authority to do such acts or to make such contracts has been conferred.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the “holding out” theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency, imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists. The existence of apparent authority may be ascertained through (1) the general manner in which the corporation holds out an officer or agent as having the power to act or, in other words, the apparent authority to act in general, with which it clothes him; or (2) the acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or constructive knowledge thereof, whether within or beyond the scope of his ordinary powers. It requires presentation of evidence of similar act(s) executed either in its favor or in favor of other parties.
Easily discernible from the foregoing is that apparent authority is determined only by the acts of the principal and not by the acts of the agent. The principal is, therefore, not responsible where the agent’s own conduct and statements have created the apparent authority.
In this case, not a single act of respondent, acting through its Board of Directors, was cited as having clothed its general manager with apparent authority to execute the contract with it. Sargasso Construction & Development Corporation / Pick & Shovel, Inc./Atlantic Erectors, Inc./ Joint Venture vs. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 170530, July 5, 2010.
Here are selected March 2009 decisions on civil, commercial and labor laws:
Family home. A family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it was duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on property owned by the persons constituting it. As pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.: “[T]he family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter’s consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family.” In other words, the family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be established partly on community property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the latter. If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it can be constituted only on his or her own property. Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary, the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family home stands is owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate court’s judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207. Thus, petitioners’ continued stay on the subject land is only by mere tolerance of respondents. Simeon Cabang, et al. vs. Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Basay, G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009.