October 2011 Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Here are selected October 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law:

Constitutional Law

Constitutionality of RA 10153. Republic Act 10153 reset the ARMM elections from August 8, 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections. The law also granted the President the power to appoint officers in charge for the Office of the ARMM Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who will hold said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.  In addressing the constitutionality of this law, the Court discussed the following issues:

Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections?  Yes. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.  The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections – whether national or local – to once every three years. This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.  These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.  Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

October 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Here are selected October 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:

Attorney; dishonesty.  It is clear from the records that respondent Atty. Ediza deceived the Spouses Floran when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to him.   Respondent also made it appear that the original owner of the land conveyed her rights therto to respondent and not to the Spouses Floran.  When the sale of the Spouses Floran’s land pushed through, respondent received half of the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled the Spouses Floran into thinking that he will register the remaining portion of the land.  Lamentably, Atty. Ediza played on the naïveté of the Spouses Floran to deprive them of their valued property.  This is an unsavory behavior from a member of the legal profession.  Aside from giving adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case, a lawyer is also expected to be truthful, fair and honest in protecting his client’s rights.  Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.  Respondent lawyer violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is suspended from the practice of law for six months.  Nemesio Floran and Caridad Floran v. Atty. Roy Prule Ediza.  A.C. No. 5325.  October 19, 2011.

Attorney; grave misconduct.  Respondent attorney was found to have violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Respondent’s actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and false representations and by taking advantage of her education and complainant’s ignorance in legal matters.  As manifested by complainant, he would have never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondent’s misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property and that complainant could register the “open” deed of sale if respondent fails to pay the loan. By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainant’s perception of the legal profession but the public’s perception as well.  Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined.  Tomas P. Tan, Jr. v. Atty. Haide V. Gumba.  A.C. No. 9000.  October 5, 2011.

October 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Labor Law and Procedure

Here are selected October 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on labor law and procedure:

Labor Law

Dismissal; constructive dismissal.  For a transfer not to be considered a constructive dismissal, the employer must be able to show that the transfer is for a valid reason, entails no diminution in the terms and conditions of employment, and must not be unreasonably inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee.  If the employer fails to meet these standards, the employee’s transfer shall amount, at the very least, to constructive dismissal.  In this case, the Supreme Court found that the real reason Menese was transferred from being the agency’s payroll and billing clerk of the PGH detachment to being a lady guard in the agency’s main office, was because of the request of Dapula, the new chief of the UP-PGH Security Division.  The latter’s request was based on the fact that she had committed the previous position of Menese to a certain Amy Claro, a protégée of Dapula.  Thus, the Supreme Court found justification for Menese’s refusal to be transferred.  Not only was the transfer arbitrary and done in bad faith, it would also result in a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay:  (1) she would hold the position of lady guard and (2) she would be paid in accordance with the statutory minimum wage, or from P11,720.00 to P7,500.00.  Clearly, there was a demotion in rank and salary undertaken in bad faith amounting to constructive dismissal.  Emirate Security and Maintenance Systems, Inc. and Roberto Yan vs. Glenda M. Menese, G.R. No. 182848. October 5, 2011.

Dismissal; illegal.  Resignation is defined as “the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to disassociate themselves from their employment.  It must be done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.”  In this case, the evidence on record suggested that petitioner did not resign; he was orally dismissed by Sy.  The crucial factor is the verbal order directly given by Sy, the company president, for petitioner to immediately turn over his accountabilities.  It is this lack of clear, valid and legal cause, not to mention due process that made his dismissal illegal, warranting reinstatement and the award of backwages.  Moreover, the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal just three weeks later is difficult to reconcile with voluntary resignation.  Had petitioner intended to voluntarily relinquish his employment after being unceremoniously dismissed by no less than the company president, he would not have sought redress from the NLRC and vigorously pursued this case against the respondents.  Jhorizaldy Uy vs. Centro Ceramica Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 174631. October 19, 2011. 

October 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure

Here are selected October 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and procedure: 

1.         REVISED PENAL CODE

Abuse of superior strength.  The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.  It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead.  Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim.  As aptly observed by the appellate court: it has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.  Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless.   Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor’s natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog y Ramin, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011.

Extinction of Criminal Liability; death.  Olaco’s death on February 17, 2010, during the pendency of her appeal, extinguished not only her criminal liability for qualified theft committed against private complainant Ruben Vinluan, but also her civil liability, particularly the award for actual damages, solely arising from or based on said crime. According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished: “By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.”   Since, Olaco’s appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against her at the time of her death, it is already unnecessary to rule on her appeal.  Whether or not Olaco was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that Olaco did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by her death, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and the guidelines laid down in People v. Bayotas. People of the Philippines v. Juliet Olaco y Poler, G.R. No. 197042, October 17, 2011.

October 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Commercial Law

Here are selected October 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on commercial law:

Check;  issuance for consideration.   Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration which may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that every party to an instrument acquires the same for a consideration or for value.   As petitioner alleged that there was no consideration for the issuance of the subject checks, it devolved upon him to present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption and prove that the checks were in fact issued without valuable consideration. Sadly, however, petitioner has not presented any credible evidence to rebut the presumption, as well as North Star’s assertion, that the checks were issued as payment for the US$85,000 petitioner owed.  Engr. Jose E. Cayanan vs. North Star International Travel, Inc.  G.R. No. 172954. October 5, 2011